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The direct marketing contract of a solar park: what investors should check before signing

A solar park with a tender award neither sells its power itself nor has it paid for by the grid operator. A direct marketer sits in between, and most of the money flows through it. This article works out how large that share is and what happens if the marketer fails, and it looks at the clauses in the contract that decide revenue and risk.

Jakob HubertJakob HubertPublished 26 October 2026~12 min read

Installations above 100 kilowatts no longer receive a fixed feed-in tariff (§ 21 para. 1 sentence 1 no. 1 EEG). A solar park therefore has to market its power directly. A direct marketer (Direktvermarkter) does this: it forecasts the feed-in, sells the power on the exchange, carries the deviations in the balancing group and settles the accounts. How the market premium model works in principle is explained in direct marketing and the market premium.

This article is about the contract in between. In a direct investment it is often negotiated by the project developer and handed over with the park. It is rarely read, although it decides most of the income.

Who actually pays a solar park what?

Two payers, two legal bases. The claim to the market premium is directed against the grid operator (§ 19 para. 1 no. 1 EEG). For installations commissioned or awarded from 2023, it is the difference between the applicable value (anzulegender Wert) and the annual market value of solar, if positive (Annex 1 no. 4.1.2 EEG). The exchange revenue for the power delivered, by contrast, is paid by the direct marketer. Under the EEG it is not the debtor of the support at all.

How this splits depends on the gap between applicable value and market value. In 2025 the annual market value of solar was 4.508 cents per kilowatt hour, the average award in the first segment in July 2026 was 4.79 cents. The premium is then small. Our calculation per megawatt of a park with an award; solar parks in the first segment only need an award above 1 MW (§ 22 para. 3 EEG):

Applicable valueExchange revenue via the direct marketerMarket premium via the grid operatorShare of direct marketer
5.90 ct (maximum value 2026)49,35810,56082 %
4.79 ct (avg. award July 2026)49,3582,13996 %
Own calculation (scripts/direktvermarktung-vertrag-model.mjs). Per MWp, generation profile of the German solar fleet 2025 scaled to 1,000 MWh, curtailment in hours with negative prices, exchange revenue at the hourly price, annual market value 2025 4.508 ct/kWh. Figures in euros, rounded.

At 6.51 cents per paid kilowatt hour the exchange revenue is above the annual market value, because the park is curtailed in hours with negative prices. For installations commissioned from 25.02.2025 there is no premium in those periods either (§ 51 para. 1 EEG). What lies behind the annual market value and why it falls is set out in solar market value and cannibalisation. For investors this means: the state safety net on the downside is real, but most of the money comes from a private contract partner.

How much money is outstanding with the direct marketer?

Roughly one to two months of revenue, depending on the payment terms. The marketer sells the power continuously and settles afterwards. Assume it pays in the following month: then the current and the previous month are always outstanding. In 2025 exchange revenue per MWp ranged from 1,933 euros in December to 7,350 euros in July. The most valuable two consecutive months were July and August with 12,660 euros together, a good quarter of the annual revenue.

For a 10 MWp park that is around 127,000 euros sitting with the marketer at the worst moment. Summer months are not automatically the strongest either: June 2025 brought less than March because of many negative hours. Longer payment terms, or settlement only after the end of a quarter, increase this amount accordingly.

What happens if the direct marketer fails?

The grid operator then takes the power temporarily under the fallback tariff (§ 21 para. 1 sentence 1 no. 3 EEG). Parliament created it expressly for cases in which operators cannot market directly, for example if their direct marketer becomes insolvent (Bundestag printed paper 18/1304, p. 91). It has three limits:

  • Amount: the applicable value is reduced by 20 per cent while the fallback tariff is used (§ 53 para. 3 EEG). In quarter-hours with negative prices it is zero as usual (§ 51 para. 1).
  • Duration: at most three consecutive calendar months and six calendar months in total per year. Anyone staying longer gets nothing for the whole month, and 10 euros per kilowatt and month are charged on top (§ 21 para. 1 sentence 1 no. 3, § 52 para. 1 no. 5 and para. 2).
  • Deadline: the switch into the fallback tariff has to be notified to the grid operator by the fifth-last working day of the previous month (§ 21c para. 1 sentence 2). Switching always takes effect on the first of a month (§ 21b para. 1 sentence 2).

“Minus 20 per cent” sounds like a manageable discount. Calculated for 2025 it was considerably larger, because the park earned more than the applicable value on the market route:

Applicable valueMarket route per yearFallback tariff per yearLess in July to September
5.90 ct59,91935,809 (minus 40 %)7,232
4.79 ct51,49829,072 (minus 44 %)6,600
Own calculation (scripts/direktvermarktung-vertrag-model.mjs). Per MWp, profile and prices 2025, market route = exchange revenue plus pro-rata annual premium, fallback tariff = 80 % of the applicable value outside negative hours. Figures in euros, rounded.

In no month of 2025 would the fallback tariff have brought more than the market route. It is a bridge for a few weeks, not a substitute. The review should therefore cover how quickly a new marketer can step in. The statute allows the marketer to be changed at any time (§ 21b para. 4 no. 1 EEG). Remote controllability towards the new marketer only has to be in place from the second calendar month after its notification to the grid operator (§ 10b para. 1 sentence 4). What can slow things down is the old contract.

What applies if the direct marketer becomes insolvent?

The insolvency administrator first decides whether to continue performing the contract (§ 103 InsO). If the operator asks, the administrator has to declare this without delay; if not, they can no longer insist on performance. Outstanding payments for power already delivered are usually insolvency claims and come back only at the dividend rate.

A clause that ends the contract automatically when insolvency is applied for helps little. Agreements that exclude the administrator's choice in advance are void (§ 119 InsO); the Federal Court of Justice expressly ruled so for insolvency-triggered termination clauses in contracts for the continuous supply of energy (judgment of 15.11.2012, IX ZR 169/11). It later allowed exceptions, but only in favour of creditors of goods or services; in favour of a creditor of money such a clause remains invalid as a rule (judgment of 27.10.2022, IX ZR 213/21). The investor delivers power and receives money, so it is on that side. Whether a direct marketing contract instead falls under § 104 InsO as a transaction with an exchange price has not yet been decided by any court. Termination rights triggered by something other than the insolvency application, such as late payment, remain effective.

In practice three things protect the investor: short payment terms, security from the marketer (for example a bank guarantee covering one or two months of revenue) and a termination right for late payment that takes effect quickly. How insolvency of the provider or operator affects a direct investment is covered in Provider or operator insolvency: what happens to your direct investment.

How is the direct marketer paid and what difference does it make?

Through a fee deducted from the exchange revenue. There is no statutory rule on its level and no official statistic. Since 2014 the legislator has priced the cost of marketing into the applicable value; a separate management premium no longer exists (Bundestag printed paper 18/1304, p. 91). Common structures are a fixed amount per megawatt hour, a discount on a reference price or a share of additional revenue, often combined.

For orders of magnitude, our own sensitivity, expressly not market prices:

Fee per MWhPer yearOver 20 yearsShare of annual revenue (AW 4.79 ct)
1 euro759 euros15,173 euros1.5 %
2 euros1,517 euros30,346 euros2.9 %
3 euros2,276 euros45,519 euros4.4 %
5 euros3,793 euros75,866 euros7.4 %
Own calculation (scripts/direktvermarktung-vertrag-model.mjs). Per MWp, 759 MWh paid volume as in 2025, 20 years nominal without degradation. Assumptions, not market prices.

Each euro per megawatt hour therefore costs around 750 euros a year per MWp. That is negotiable and belongs in the comparison of two offers. A worse settlement basis or a marketer that fails, however, usually costs more than a higher fee.

Against which price does the direct marketer settle?

This clause moves the most money. Contracts handle it differently. Broadly there are two routes. Either the marketer pays the actual exchange price of the quarter-hours in which the park fed in, minus the fee. Then the investor carries the profile of the park: if it feeds in mainly at midday, it gets the low midday prices. Or the marketer pays a fixed reference, for example the official solar market value minus a discount. Then the marketer carries the profile and forecasting risk and charges for it in the discount.

Which route is better depends on the park. An east-west installation that delivers more in the morning and evening earns more than average at the actual price; a south-facing installation with a high midday peak tends to earn less. Above all, provider and revenue forecast should use the same basis. How orientation affects revenue is shown in South, east-west or vertical: which solar park layout pays off for investors.

Who curtails the park at negative prices and in redispatch?

At negative prices usually the direct marketer, but only because the contract provides for it. The EEG requires that the marketer can retrieve the actual feed-in and control the output remotely; the operator has to grant it the authority to do so (§ 10b para. 1 sentence 1 EEG). There is no statutory duty to curtail at negative prices. For new installations, however, the claim to support lapses in those quarter-hours (§ 51 para. 1). Anyone feeding in anyway sells at a negative price. The contract should therefore set the price at which curtailment starts and who bears the cost if it happens too late. The mechanics of the negative price rule are explained in Negative electricity prices: what they mean for solar and storage investors.

In redispatch the grid operator curtails, not the marketer. The balancing compensation goes to the balancing group, in practice the marketer; the financial compensation for lost income runs between grid operator and installation operator (§ 13a paras. 1a and 2 EnWG). Data provision is often handled by the marketer as the so-called deployment manager (Einsatzverantwortlicher); the obligation remains with the operator (Federal Network Agency, determination BK6-20-059). The contract should state whether the marketer takes on this role and what it costs. How the compensation is calculated is set out in Curtailment of a solar park: when the grid operator pays and when it does not.

How long does the contract run and what applies when buying a park?

The term is freely negotiated; the EEG only requires that a change of sales form takes effect on the first of a month and is notified to the grid operator in advance (§ 21b para. 1 sentence 2, § 21c para. 1 sentence 1). The statute allows the operator to change the marketer itself at any time. Whether they may do so without breaching the old contract is governed by that contract alone. Short terms with automatic renewal give flexibility, multi-year contracts often better terms. Anyone wanting to place a share in a PPA needs an opening clause for it; the EEG allows a percentage split between several sales forms (§ 21b para. 2). More on this in Understanding PPAs: how power purchase agreements make solar park revenues predictable.

A direct investment adds a special case: the investor takes over a park for which the developer has already signed the contract. Taking over the contract requires the marketer's consent. Before the purchase it should therefore be clear whether the contract transfers, whether the marketer has consented and whether there is a special termination right for a change of operator. Which documents belong to the purchase of an operating installation is shown in Existing solar park or new build: what changes when the plant is already running?.

Which clauses belong in a direct marketing contract?

ClauseWhat to look forWhy
Feefixed amount or discount, indexation, extra costs for remote control and redispatchcomparability of two offers
Negative pricescurtailment threshold, liability for late curtailmentno support in those quarter-hours
Term and terminationminimum term, renewal, special termination on change of operator and change in lawswitching and selling the park
Settlement basisactual quarter-hour price or fixed reference such as the solar market valuewho carries the profile risk
Payment terms and securitymonthly settlement, short deadline, guarantee, termination for late paymentoutstanding claim if the marketer fails
Own compilation. Not legal advice.

What should not be overrated in the contract?

  • The fee on its own. A tenth of a cent more or less is visible, but settlement basis and payment terms usually weigh more.
  • The marketer's brand. Creditworthiness matters, but security and termination rights protect you even if a contract partner's situation changes.
  • Your own bargaining power. For a single park, the developer often contracts for many parks and gets better terms than an individual investor. What matters then is that the contract is disclosed and transfers.
  • The fallback tariff. It is a bridge for switching, not a protection of revenue.

Which questions should you ask the provider about the direct marketing contract?

  • Who is the direct marketer and how long has it been marketing solar parks? Is the full contract available?
  • Against which price is settlement made? Does the revenue forecast use the same basis?
  • How high is the fee? Which costs are added for remote control, redispatch or forecast deviations?
  • When is payment made? Is there security from the marketer? What applies in case of late payment?
  • At which price is curtailment triggered? Who is liable if it happens too late?
  • How long does the contract run? Does it transfer to me on purchase? Has the marketer consented?
  • Which marketer could take over in case of default, and how quickly?

How we assess the direct marketing contract in project review

We ask for the contract before the reservation and compare it with the revenue forecast: same settlement basis, same fee, same assumption for negative hours. We then check how long money sits with the marketer, whether there is security and whether the contract transfers to the investor with the park. What comes after handover in terms of statements and reports is described in What happens after closing: reporting, asset management and why a partner is not a broker. That is exactly what we review in a no-obligation initial consultation. We do not give return guarantees.


Frequently asked questions

What is a direct marketing contract?

The contract by which the operator commissions a direct marketer to sell the power of the installation on the exchange. The marketer forecasts the feed-in, trades the power, carries deviations in the balancing group and settles the accounts. For installations above 100 kilowatts direct marketing is the rule, because there is no fixed feed-in tariff there.

Who pays the market premium, the direct marketer or the grid operator?

The grid operator (§ 19 para. 1 no. 1 EEG). The direct marketer pays the exchange revenue. At an award value of 4.79 cents and the market values of 2025 the premium was small; in our calculation around 96 per cent of revenue came from the marketer.

What does direct marketing of a solar park cost?

It is freely negotiated; there is no official statistic. Common are a fixed amount per megawatt hour or a discount on a reference price. For orientation: each euro per megawatt hour costs around 750 euros a year per MWp.

How high is the fallback tariff?

The applicable value minus 20 per cent (§ 53 para. 3 EEG), zero in quarter-hours with negative prices. It applies for at most three consecutive months and six months a year. Because the market route in 2025 was above the applicable value, it would have brought around 40 to 44 per cent less in our calculation.

Can I change the direct marketer?

Under the EEG at any time (§ 21b para. 4 no. 1), but only within the existing contract: its term and notice periods continue to apply. Towards the new marketer, remote controllability only has to be in place from the second calendar month after its notification to the grid operator.

What happens to my money if the direct marketer becomes insolvent?

Outstanding payments for power already delivered are usually insolvency claims and come back only at the dividend rate. The insolvency administrator decides whether to continue the contract (§ 103 InsO). Until a new marketer takes over, the park can switch to the fallback tariff.

Does the direct marketing contract transfer to me when I buy a park?

Only with the marketer's consent, because it is a transfer of contract. Before the purchase it should be clear whether it has consented and whether there is a special termination right for the change of operator.

Sources

  1. § 19 EEG, payment claim; para. 1 no. 1 (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  2. § 20 EEG, market premium (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  3. § 21 EEG, feed-in tariff, fallback tariff; para. 1 sentence 1 nos. 1 and 3 (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  4. § 21b EEG, allocation to a sales form, switching; paras. 1, 2 and 4 (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  5. § 21c EEG, switching procedure (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  6. § 10b EEG, requirements for direct marketing; para. 1 (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  7. § 51 EEG, reduction of the payment claim at negative prices (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  8. § 52 EEG, reduction of the payment claim for breaches of duty (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  9. § 53 EEG, reduction of the feed-in tariff; para. 3 fallback tariff (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  10. § 22 EEG, competitive determination of the market premium; para. 3 (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  11. Annex 1 EEG, amount of the market premium; no. 4 annual market value (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  12. German Bundestag, printed paper 18/1304, draft EEG 2014, explanatory memorandum p. 91 (fallback marketing, management premium)
  13. § 103 InsO, administrator's right to choose (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  14. § 104 InsO, fixed-date transactions, financial services (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  15. § 119 InsO, invalidity of deviating agreements (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  16. Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 15.11.2012, IX ZR 169/11: insolvency-triggered termination clauses in energy supply contracts (full text at lexetius)
  17. Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 27.10.2022, IX ZR 213/21: limits of insolvency-triggered termination clauses (full text at openJur)
  18. § 13a EnWG, generation adjustment and its balancing and financial compensation (gesetze-im-internet.de)
  19. Federal Network Agency, determination BK6-20-059 of 06.11.2020: grid operator coordination and deployment manager in redispatch
  20. Netztransparenz.de (transmission system operators): market value overview with annual and monthly solar market values
  21. Federal Network Agency: completed tenders for solar installations of the first segment, award values
  22. SMARD (Federal Network Agency): day-ahead wholesale prices and solar generation, hourly

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